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My bibliography on Zotero:

Cyranoski, D., & Reardon, S. (2015). Chinese scientists genetically modify human embryos. Nature. http://doi.org/10.1038/nature.2015.17378
Smith, A. C., Houser, D., Leeson, P. T., & Ostad, R. (2014). The costs of conflict. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 97, 61–71.
Lacomba, J. A., Lagos, F., Reuben, E., & Van Winden, F. (2014). On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 40–57.
Drone carrying bottle of radioactive material lands on Japanese prime minister’s office. (n.d.). Retrieved April 23, 2015, from http://mashable.com/2015/04/22/japan-drone-prime-minister/
Griffith, R. L., Wright, J. T., Maldonado, J., Povich, M. S., Sigurđsson, S., & Mullan, B. (2015). THE Ĝ INFRARED SEARCH FOR EXTRATERRESTRIAL CIVILIZATIONS WITH LARGE ENERGY SUPPLIES. III. THE REDDEST EXTENDED SOURCES IN WISE. The Astrophysical Journal Supplement Series, 217(2), 25. http://doi.org/10.1088/0067-0049/217/2/25
Sheremeta, R. M. (2011). Perfect-substitutes, best-shot, and weakest-link contests between groups. Korean Economic Review, 27, 5–32.
Ahn, T., Isaac, R. M., & Salmon, T. C. (2011). Rent seeking in groups. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(1), 116–125.
Faravelli, M., & Stanca, L. (2012). When less is more: rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1), 170–183.
Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27(3), 491–514.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 1–61.
Saaksvuori, L., Mappes, T., & Puurtinen, M. (2011). Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 278(1723), 3428–3436. http://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2011.0252
Cason, T. N., Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2012). Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1), 26–43.
Tarpley, W. G. (n.d.). How the Venetian System Was Transplanted Into England. Retrieved April 22, 2015, from http://www.abjpress.com/tarpb1.html
Tarpley, W. G. (n.d.). The Venetian Conspiracy. Retrieved April 22, 2015, from http://www.abjpress.com/tarpv1.html
Yuhas, A. (n.d.). Chimpanzees granted petition to hear “legal persons” status in court. Retrieved April 22, 2015, from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/21/chimpanzees-granted-legal-persons-status-unlawful-imprisonment
Fouracre, P. (n.d.). The Origins of the Early Medieval State.
Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2012). Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts. Economics Letters, 117(1), 45–48.
Abbink, K. (2012). Laboratory experiments on conflict. Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict. Oxford University Press, New York.
Abbink, K., Masclet, D., & Mirza, D. (2011). Inequality and Riots–Experimental Evidence. CIRANO-Scientific Publication, (2011s-10).
Abbink, K., & Brandts, J. (2009). Political autonomy and independence: theory and experimental evidence.-Revised version with new data.
Wiens, K. (2015 4–21). We Can’t Let John Deere Destroy the Very Idea of Ownership. Retrieved April 21, 2015, from http://www.wired.com/2015/04/dmca-ownership-john-deere/
Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2013). Brothers in arms–An experiment on the alliance puzzle. Games and Economic Behavior, 77(1), 61–76.
Zhang, J. (2012). Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods.
Fallucchi, F., Renner, E., & Sefton, M. (2013). Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games. European Economic Review, 64, 223–240. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.09.003
Bernard, M., Dreber, A., Strimling, P., & Eriksson, K. (2013). The subgroup problem: When can binding voting on extractions from a common pool resource overcome the tragedy of the commons? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 91, 122–130. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.04.009
Leibbrandt, A., & Sääksvuori, L. (2010). More than words: communication in intergroup conflicts. Jena economic research papers.
Wilson, D. S., & Hessen, D. O. (n.d.). Blueprint for the Global Village.
Wilson, D. S. (n.d.). Mopping up Final Opposition to Group Selection.
Pendleton, B. (n.d.). The Grumpy Programmer: RFIDs, Encryption, and Stop Rules... Oh My! Retrieved April 21, 2015, from http://www.thegrumpyprogrammer.com/2015/04/rfids-encryption-and-stop-rules-oh-my.html
Bolle, F., Tan, J. H. W., & Zizzo, D. J. (2014). Vendettas. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6(2), 93–130. http://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.2.93
Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2014). Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict. Economic Inquiry.
Prediger, S., Vollan, B., & Herrmann, B. (2013). Resource scarcity, spite and cooperation. Working Papers in Economics and Statistics.
Schmitz Jr, J. A. (2012). New and larger costs of monopoly and tariffs. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report, 468.
Münster, J., & Staal, K. (2012). How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking. Public Choice, 150(3-4), 579–594.
Kolmar, M., & Wagener, A. (2012). Group identities in conflicts.
Hu, W., & Treich, N. (2011). Cooperate and Conquer.
Beekman, G., Cheung, S. L., & Levely, I. V. (2014). The Effect of Conflict History on Cooperation Within and Between Groups: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment.
Bayer, R.-C. (2015). Cooperation and Distributive Conflict.
Mäs, M., & Dijkstra, J. (2014). Do Intergroup Conflicts Necessarily Result from Outgroup Hate? PLoS ONE, 9(6), e97848. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0097848
Gneezy, A., & Fessler, D. M. (2011). Combat and Cooperation: War Increases Prosocial Punishments and Rewards. CONFLICT, STICKS AND CARROTS: WAR INCREASES PROSOCIAL PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, A. Gneezy and D. Fessler, Eds., June, 20111.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 1–61.
Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Behavior in Contests. Available at SSRN 2468838.
Kimbrough, E. O., Rubin, J., Sheremeta, R. M., & Shields, T. W. (2013). Commitment problems in conflict resolution. Available at SSRN 2251525.
Oates, T. (n.d.). Stop Fearing Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2015, from http://social.techcrunch.com/2015/04/08/stop-fearing-artificial-intelligence/
Goette, L., Huffman, D., Meier, S., & Sutter, M. (2010). Group membership, competition, and altruistic versus antisocial punishment: evidence from randomly assigned army groups.
Sasaki, T., & Uchida, S. (2012). The evolution of cooperation by social exclusion. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 280(1752), 20122498–20122498. http://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2498
Riedl, A., Rohde, I. M., & Strobel, M. (2011). Efficient coordination in weakest-link games.
Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., Lenaerts, T., & Pereira, L. M. (2015). Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation dilemmas. Scientific Reports, 5, 9312. http://doi.org/10.1038/srep09312
Ranjbar-Sahraei, B., Bloembergen, D., Ammar, H. B., Tuyls, K., & Weiss, G. (n.d.). Effects of Evolution on the Emergence of Scale Free Networks. In ALIFE 14: The Fourteenth Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems (Vol. 14, pp. 376–383).
Ranjbar-Sahraei, B., Ammar, H. B., Bloembergen, D., Tuyls, K., & Weiss, G. (2014). Theory of cooperation in complex social networks. In Proceedings of the 25th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14).
Bloembergen, D., Ranjbar-Sahraei, B., Ammar, H. B., Tuyls, K., & Weiss, G. (2014). Influencing social networks: An optimal control study. In In Proceedings of the 21st European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 105–110).
Ranjbar-Sahraei, B., Bou Ammar, H., Bloembergen, D., Tuyls, K., & Weiss, G. (2014). Evolution of cooperation in arbitrary complex networks. In Proceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems (pp. 677–684). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
Saptawijaya, A., & Pereira, L. M. (n.d.). Logic Programming Applied to Machine Ethics.
Saptawijaya, A., & Pereira, L. M. (2014). The Potential of Logic Programming as a Computational Tool to Model Morality. A Construction Manual for Robot’s Ethical Systems: Requirements, Methods, Implementations", Lecture Notes in Cognitive Technologies Series, Springer.
Lewis, H. M., Vinicius, L., Strods, J., Mace, R., & Migliano, A. B. (2014). High mobility explains demand sharing and enforced cooperation in egalitarian hunter-gatherers. Nature Communications, 5, 5789. http://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms6789
Sasaki, T. (2014). The Evolution of Cooperation Through Institutional Incentives and Optional Participation. Dynamic Games and Applications, 4(3), 345–362. http://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-013-0094-7
Tufekci, Z. (2015, April 18). The Machines Are Coming. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/opinion/sunday/the-machines-are-coming.html
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2012). Averting group failures in collective-risk social dilemmas. EPL (Europhysics Letters), 99(6), 68003.
Gaudeul, A., Crosetto, P., & Riener, G. (2015). Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient. Available at SSRN 2550756.
Bravo, G., & Squazzoni, F. (2013). Exit, Punishment and Rewards in Commons Dilemmas: An Experimental Study. PLoS ONE, 8(8), e69871. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0069871
Sasaki, T., Brannstrom, A., Dieckmann, U., & Sigmund, K. (2012). The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(4), 1165–1169. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1115219109
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2013). Good Agreements Make Good Friends. Scientific Reports, 3. http://doi.org/10.1038/srep02695
Bryson, J. J., Mitchell, J., Powers, S. T., & Sylwester, K. (2014). Understanding and Addressing Cultural Variation in Costly Antisocial Punishment. In M. A. Gibson & D. W. Lawson (Eds.), Applied Evolutionary Anthropology (pp. 201–222). New York, NY: Springer New York. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4939-0280-4_9
Chen, X., & Perc, M. (2014). Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility. Scientific Reports, 4. http://doi.org/10.1038/srep04161
Brañas-Garza, P., Espín, A. M., Exadaktylos, F., & Herrmann, B. (2014). Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game. Scientific Reports, 4. http://doi.org/10.1038/srep06025
Bone, J., Silva, A. S., & Raihani, N. J. (2014). Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties. Biology Letters, 10(7), 20140388–20140388. http://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2014.0388
LeVeck, B. L., Hughes, D. A., Fowler, J. H., Hafner-Burton, E., & Victor, D. G. (2014). The role of self-interest in elite bargaining. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(52), 18536–18541. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1409885111
Bryson, J. J. (2014). Artificial Intelligence and Pro-Social Behaviour.
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2011). The evolution of antisocial punishment in optional public goods games. Nature Communications, 2, 434. http://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms1442
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2013). Trust, growth and well-being: New evidence and policy implications.
Taylor, D. J. (2014). Evolution of the Social Contract.
Goette, L., Huffman, D., Meier, S., & Sutter, M. (2012). Competition between organizational groups: Its impact on altruistic and antisocial motivations. Management Science, 58(5), 948–960.
Sylwester, K., Herrmann, B., & Bryson, J. J. (2013). Homo homini lupus? Explaining antisocial punishment. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 6(3), 167–188. http://doi.org/10.1037/npe0000009
Herrmann, B., Thoni, C., & Gachter, S. (2008). Antisocial Punishment Across Societies. Science, 319(5868), 1362–1367. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1153808
Shimao, H., & Nakamaru, M. (2013). Strict or Graduated Punishment? Effect of Punishment Strictness on the Evolution of Cooperation in Continuous Public Goods Games. PLoS ONE, 8(3), e59894. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0059894
Jiang, L.-L., Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2013). If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game. PLoS ONE, 8(5), e64677. http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0064677
Dos Santos, M., Rankin, D. J., & Wedekind, C. (2013). HUMAN COOPERATION BASED ON PUNISHMENT REPUTATION. Evolution, 67(8), 2446–2450. http://doi.org/10.1111/evo.12108
Menand, L. (n.d.). When the C.I.A. Duped College Students. Retrieved April 19, 2015, from http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/23/a-friend-of-the-devil
Wilson-Goldie, K. (n.d.). Neverending Story. Retrieved April 19, 2015, from http://artforum.com/slant/id=51428
Bock, L. (2015 4–7). Here’s Google's Secret to Hiring the Best People. Retrieved April 19, 2015, from http://www.wired.com/2015/04/hire-like-google/
Reuter, C. (2015, April 18). The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html
Dos Santos, M., & Wedekind, C. (2015). Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. Evolution and Human Behavior, 36(1), 59–64. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.09.001
Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. (2015). Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so: THIRD-PARTY PUNISHERS ARE REWARDED. Evolution, 69(4), 993–1003. http://doi.org/10.1111/evo.12637
Raihani, N. J., & Bshary, R. (2015). The reputation of punishers. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 30(2), 98–103. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2014). Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(46), 16425–16430. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1407887111
Sasaki, T., & Uchida, S. (2014). Rewards and the evolution of cooperation in public good games. Biology Letters, 10(1), 20130903–20130903. http://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2013.0903
Chen, X., Gross, T., & Dieckmann, U. (2013). Shared rewarding overcomes defection traps in generalized volunteer’s dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 335, 13–21.
Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., Rohl, T., & Milinski, M. (2014). Democratic decisions establish stable authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(2), 752–756. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1315273111
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006). The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature, 444(7120), 718–723. http://doi.org/10.1038/nature05229
Rand, D. G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2009). Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation. Science, 325(5945), 1272–1275. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1177418
Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., Wu, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2014). Zero-determinant alliances in multiplayer social dilemmas. arXiv Preprint arXiv:1404.2886.
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2015). Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 374, 115–124. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032
Liu, J., Li, Y., Xu, C., & Hui, P. M. (2015). Evolutionary behavior of generalized zero-determinant strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications, 430, 81–92. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2015.02.080
Berger, D. (n.d.). Establishing Trust In The Bitcoin Ecosystem. Retrieved April 17, 2015, from http://social.techcrunch.com/2015/04/16/people-arent-algorithms-or-an-argument-for-establishing-trust-in-the-bitcoin-ecosystem/
Akin, E. (2012). Stable Cooperative Solutions for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. arXiv Preprint arXiv:1211.0969.
Dong, H., Zhi-Hai, R., & Tao, Z. (2014). Zero-determinant strategy: An underway revolution in game theory. Chinese Physics B, 23(7), 078905.
Archivematica. (n.d.). Retrieved April 17, 2015, from https://www.archivematica.org/wiki/Overview
John, A. S. (n.d.). What Monkeys Can Teach You About Money. Retrieved April 17, 2015, from http://mentalfloss.com/article/28601/what-monkeys-can-teach-you-about-money
Catteeuw, D. (2014). Emergence of Honest Signaling through Learning and Evolution.
Schoenmakers, S., Hilbe, C., Blasius, B., & Traulsen, A. (2014). Sanctions as honest signals – The evolution of pool punishment by public sanctioning institutions. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 356, 36–46. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.04.019

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